

CIA/OCI/BRIEF 112-75
21 JULY 1975

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP85T00508R000300010014-4

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MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF 112-75.4

1. PERSIAN GULF: THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF IRAN, IRAQ, AND SAUDI ARABIA APPARENTLY FAILED TO AGREE ON NEW STEPS TO STRENGTHEN REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION WHEN THEY MET WITH GULF FOREIGN MINISTERS THIS WEEK IN JIDDA DURING THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] NO DECISIONS WERE TAKEN BECAUSE THE MAJORITY OF STATES WERE UNINTERESTED IN MOVING QUICKLY ON THE SUBJECT.⁴

EARLIER THIS YEAR, THE SHAH OF IRAN WAS ENCOURAGED BY POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GULF TO BELIEVE THAT THE TIME WAS RIPE TO RESUME HIS SEARCH-BEGINNIN 1968-FOR A FORMULA UNDER WHICH IRAN COULD PLAY A GREATER PEACEKEEPING ROLE ON THE GULF'S WESTERN SHORE. HE HAD HOPED THE DISCUSSIONS IN JIDDA WOULD LEAD TO AN EARLY CONFERENCE ON REGIONAL SECURITY AND EVENTUALLY TO A COMPREHENSIVE PACT PROTECTING EXISTING REGIMES AGAINST BOTH FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND LOCAL THREATS TO THE STATUS QUO.⁴

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THE MAIN OBSTACLE IN JIDDA WAS APPARENTLY SAUDIA ARABIA, WITH THE SMALLER GULF STATES PROBABLY FOLLOWING ITS LEAD. THE MISTRUSTFUL SAUDIS DO NOT BELIEVE A REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENT IS WARRANTED AND PREFER TO RELY ON BILATERAL TIES. THEY CERTAINLY DO NOT SHARE THE SHAH'S PERCEPTION OF A POWER VACUUM ON THE WESTERN SIDE OF THE GULF THAT IRAN SHOULD HELP FILL.⁴

IRAN SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF A FORMAL DECLARATION RESTRICTED TO ASSURING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF, [REDACTED] BUT IT DID NOT FAVOR THE MORE COMPREHENSIVE IRANIAN APPROACH.⁴

THE IRANIANS CAN BE EXPECTED TO PORTRAY THE JIDDA MEETING IN THE BEST LIGHT, CLAIMING AS PROGRESS THE FACT THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME ALL GULF STATES MET TO DISCUSS COMMON PROBLEMS. NEVERTHELESS, THE APPARENT FAILURE TO AGREE EITHER ON HOLDING A CONFERENCE, OR ON ISSUING A COMMON STATEMENT ON THE DESIRABILITY OF LIMITING FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN THE GULF, IS A DISAPPOINTMENT FOR THE

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SHAH. [CONFIDENTIAL]4

2. ETHIOPIA: THE RULING MILITARY COUNCIL HAS ARRESTED SEVERAL HIGH-RANKING POLICE OFFICERS AND SOME AIR FORCE OFFICERS FOR ALLEGEDLY PARTICIPATING IN ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY.4

SIX POLICE OFFICERS, INCLUDING THE VICE COMMISSIONER, AND SIX POLICE NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS WERE ARRESTED TUESDAY. FIVE OTHER POLICE OFFICERS WERE ARRESTED ON FRIDAY. A LARGE NUMBER OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL, INCLUDING MANY OFFICERS, WERE ARRESTED ON FRIDAY AND BROUGHT TO ADDIS ABABA FROM THE MAIN AIR BASE SOUTH OF THE CAPITAL.4

THOSE ARRESTED ARE ACCUSED OF COMPLICITY IN THE TEMPORARY DETENTION LAST WEEKEND OF GENERAL BERHANE TEFERA, THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSIONER, BY DISSIDENT SECURITY FORCES IN EASTERN ETHIOPIA. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER ARMY OR POLICE UNITS-OR BOTH-WERE RESPONSIBLE. THE DISSIDENTS REPORTEDLY ALSO TRIED TO SEIZE GENERAL TEFERI BENTI, THE COUNCIL'S CHAIRMAN. BERHANE AND TEFERI WERE VISITING THE THIRD DIVISION, WHICH IS HEADQUARTERED 225 MILES NORTHEAST OF ADDIS ABABA, TO ATTEMPT TO CALM THE

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TROOPS' INCREASING OPPOSITION TO THE COUNCIL, ESPECIALLY ITS LAND-REFORM PROBABLY PROGRAM.4

THE DISSIDENTS DETAINED BERHANE FOR FOUR HOURS TO DRAMATIZE THEIR DEMANDS FOR RESTORING LAND GRANTS TO RETIRING MILITARY PERSONNEL, AN IMMEDIATE RETURN TO CIVILIAN RULE, AND A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THE CONFLICT IN ERITREA. THE ARRESTED POLICE OFFICERS ALLEGEDLY PLOTTED AGAINST BERHANE AND GAVE INFORMATION TO THE EASTERN DISSIDENTS THAT CAUSED THEM TO DETAIN BERHANE. THE COUNCIL REPORTEDLY DISCOVERED LEAFLETS LINKING THE ARRESTED AIR FORCE PERSONNEL TO THE INCIDENT.4

THE ARRESTS HAVE INCREASED TENSIONS WITHIN THE POLICE AND THE MILITARY. THE ETHIOPIAN POLICE ARE A LARGE AND WELL-ORGANIZED FORCE. A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THEM AND FORCES LOYAL TO THE COUNCIL COULD LEAD TO SERIOUS FIGHTING. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE SO FAR, HOWEVER, THAT POLICE OR ARMED FORCES DISSIDENTS ARE ATTEMPTING TO ORGANIZE AN OVERT MOVE AGAINST THE COUNCIL. {CONFIDENTIAL}4

3. SPANISH SAHARA: ALGERIA'S REITERATION OF SUPPORT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PEOPLE OF SPANISH SAHARA BEFORE THE

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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE THIS WEEK MAY AGAIN STRAIN RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO.⁴

THE ALGERIAN REPRESENTATIVE CONCLUDED A THREE-DAY PRESENTATION ON JULY 16 BY CALLING UPON THE COURT, WHICH IS TO GIVE AN ADVISORY OPINION THIS FALL ON LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE SAHARAN DISPUTE, TO ACKNOWLEDGE "THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF SPANISH SAHARA TO SELF-DETERMINATION."⁴

THE ALGERIANS CHARACTERIZED THIS RIGHT AS A HIGHER PRINCIPLE THAN EXISTING TERRITORIAL CLAIMS, AN OBVIOUS REFERENCE TO THE ARGUMENTS ADVANCED EARLIER BY MAURITANIA AND MOROCCO. THE ALGERIAN PRESENTATION SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THE NEED FOR A REFERENDUM ORGANIZED AND HELD UNDER UN AUSPICES.⁴

IT ALSO AFFIRMED THAT INTERVENTION WAS LAWFUL IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLES, PRESUMABLY IN DEFENSE OF ALGIERS' SUPPORT OF A PRO-INDEPENDENCE SAHARAN PARTY, THE POLISARIO FRONT.⁴

SO FAR THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT HAS REACTED WITH RESTRAINT. A JOINT ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN STATEMENT ISSUED TWO WEEKS AGO

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FOLLOWING A VISIT TO RABAT BY ALGERIA'S FOREIGN MINISTER PROFESSED A COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON THE FUTURE OF SPANISH SAHARA. THE MOROCCAN OPPOSITION PRESS HAS PREDICTABLY CONDEMNED ALGERIA'S PRESENTATION AND QUESTIONED THE VALUE OF THE RECENT MOROCCAN-ALGERIAN UNDERSTANDING.⁴

KING HASSAN RECENTLY APPEARED CONFIDENT HE AND THE ALGERIANS WERE IN AGREEMENT THAT:⁴

--ALGIERS WILL NOT INTERVENE MILITARILY IF MOROCCO OCCUPIES THE SAHARA.⁴

--THERE WILL BE NO REPETITION OF THE MOROCCAN-ALGERIAN BORDER WAR OF 1963.⁴

--ALGIERS HAS NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS ON THE SAHARA.⁴

IN RETURN, KING HASSAN PRESUMABLY HAS PROMISED RATIFICATION OF A BORDER AGREEMENT SIGNED IN 1972 AS THE REWARD FOR ALGERIAN ACQUIESCENCE.⁴

KING HASSAN'S CONFIDENCE MAY BE MISPLACED. THE ALGERIANS MAY ONLY HAVE BEEN BUYING TIME FOR MANEUVER. A REFERENCE TO THE RIGHT OF INTERVENTION IN ALGERIA'S PRESENTATION TO THE COURT KEEPS OPEN

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ALGIERS' OPTION TO BUILD UP THE INSURGENT CAPABILITIES OF THE POLISARIO FRONT. {CONFIDENTIAL}4

4. ANGOLA: THE ZAIRIAN NEWS AGENCY REPORTS THAT HOLDEN ROBERTO, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA, HAS LEFT KINSHASA FOR NORTHERN ANGOLA TO DIRECT THE FRONT'S MILITARY OPERATIONS. IN THE FIGHTING THIS PAST WEEK, FORCES OF THE FRONT WERE DRIVEN OUT OF LUANDA BY TROOPS OF THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA. THE FRONT IS NOW LARGELY LIMITED TO NORTHERN ANGOLA.4

SINCE THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT WAS ESTABLISHED LAST JANUARY, ROBERTO HAS BEEN UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM HIS CHIEF BACKER, ZAIRIAN PRESIDENT MOBUTU, AND FROM OTHER FRONT LEADERS TO MOVE TO LUANDA. HE REFUSED TO DO SO, SERIOUSLY IMPAIRING THE FRONT'S EFFECTIVENESS. ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

IT IS PROBABLY TOO LATE NOW TO RE-ESTABLISH THE FRONT IN THE CAPITAL, EVEN IF ROBERTO IS INDEED IN NORTHERN ANGOLA. FRONT LEADERS HAVE TALKED ABOUT ORGANIZING A PUSH ON LUANDA FROM THE NORTH, BUT WE DOUBT ROBERTO CAN MUSTER THE RESOURCES TO DO SO.4

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NEW FIGHTING HAS BEEN REPORTED SOME 150 MILES EAST OF LUANDA. THE POPULAR MOVEMENT HAS CLEARED FRONT UNITS FROM TWO KEY TOWNS ON A MAIN HIGHWAY FROM LUANDA TO EASTERN ANGOLA. [CONFIDENTIAL]4

5. PAKISTAN: PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO'S POPULARITY HAS DECLINED SOMEWHAT BECAUSE OF PAKISTAN'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND BHUTTO'S PROCLIVITY FOR AUTHORITARIAN MEASURES. BHUTTO'S CONTROL OVER THE GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, IS NOT LIKELY TO BE SERIOUSLY CHALLENGED IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.4

GOVERNMENT HARASSMENT AND CENSORSHIP HAVE CAUSED OPPOSITION PARTIES TO BOYCOTT PARLIAMENT IN RECENT MONTHS. HUNDREDS OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL AWAMI PARTY, PAKISTAN'S LARGEST OPPOSITION GROUP, WERE JAILED AFTER THE PARTY WAS BANNED IN FEBRUARY. IF BHUTTO FAILS TO OBTAIN THE SUPREME COURT'S APPROVAL OF THEBAN, HE REPORTEDLY PLANS TO PRESS SABOTAGE CHARGES AGAINST A NUMBER OF THE PARTY'S LEADERS.4

BHUTTO'S POPULARITY HAS ALSO BEEN HURT BY HIS SLOWNESS IN COPING WITH THE INFIGHTING WHICH BEGAN OVER A YEAR AGO BETWEEN TWO FACTIONS OF HIS PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY IN PUNJAB.

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PAKISTAN'S MOST POPULOUS PROVINCE. HE FINALLY TOOK ACTION THIS MONTH BY FIRING THE PROVINCE'S CHIEF MINISTER, WHO LED ONE FACTION; HE REPORTEDLY IS PLANNING TO REMOVE THE LEADER OF THE OTHER FACTION SOON FROM HIS POST AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR. THE BICKERING HAS EMBARRASSED THE PARTY, HAMPERED PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION, AND REOPENED THE ISSUE OF PUNJABI NATIONALISM, A PERENNIAL CONCERN OF THE OTHER PROVINCES.⁴

DESPITE THESE DIFFICULTIES, BHUTTO AND HIS PARTY REMAIN DOMINANT THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. IN PAKISTAN'S POLITICALLY SENSITIVE WESTERN FRONTIER PROVINCES THE PARTY IS LESS POPULAR THAN ELSEWHERE, BUT IT HAS RETAINED CONTROL OF THE FRONTIER PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS THROUGH POLITICAL MANEUVERING AND LIBERAL USE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY, FINANCIAL RESOURCES, AND SECURITY FORCES. IN THE SEMI-AUTONOMOUS REGION OF AZAD {"FREE"} KASHMIR, THE PARTY WON CONTROL OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A RIGGED ELECTION LAST MAY.⁴

IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE, PAKISTANI OFFICIALS APPEAR APPREHENSIVE THAT INDIAN PRIME MINISTER GANDHI MAY RESORT TO

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AGGRESSION AGAINST PAKISTAN IN THE MONTHS AHEAD IN ORDER TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM HER RECENT CONTROVERSIAL DOMESTIC ACTIONS. NEGOTIATIONS WITH INDIA UNDER THE 1972 SIMLA AGREEMENT HAVE CONTINUED, BUT THERE HAS BEEN NO MAJOR NEW PROGRESS TOWARD RESOLVING REMAINING DIFFERENCES. 4

TENSIONS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN HAVE EASED SOMEWHAT IN RECENT MONTHS, BUT PROSPECTS REMAIN POOR FOR RESOLVING THE LONG-STANDING TERRITORIAL DISPUTE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. RELATIONS WITH BANGLADESH REMAIN DEADLOCKED OVER HOW TO DIVIDE PRE-1971 PAKISTAN'S ASSETS AND LIABILITIES AND WHAT TO DO WITH THE PRO-ISLAMABAD "BIHARI" MINORITY COMMUNITY IN BANGLADESH. 4

RELATIONS WITH CHINA, IRAN, AND THE ARAB STATES REMAIN WARM, ALTHOUGH ISLAMABAD IS CONCERNED THAT IT MAY NOT BE ABLE TO GET THE IRANIANS AND THE ARABS TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT FUNDING FOR THE ARMS PURCHASES PAKISTAN HOPES TO MAKE. PAKISTAN'S LONG-STANDING WARINESS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS HAS PROBABLY BEEN REINFORCED BY MOSCOW'S STRONG SUPPORT FOR GANDHI'S RECENT DOMESTIC MOVES.

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ARGENTINA: ARGENTINE ECONOMY MINISTER RODRIGO'S RESIGNATION HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AND THIS WILL PROBABLY EASE SOME OF THE PRESSURE ON PRESIDENT PERON, BUT NOW NO ONE IN THE ADMINISTRATION IS IN CHARGE OF ECONOMIC POLICY. 4

LABOR LEADERS ARE SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT TODAY TO PRESENT 35 DEMANDS ON ECONOMIC POLICY, PROBABLY INCLUDING MORE CABINET RESIGNATIONS. 4

PRESS SOURCES OVER THE WEEKEND SAID THAT MRS. PERON WILL GIVE IN TO DEMANDS TO OUST AS MANY AS FOUR MORE MINISTERS. THIS WOULD BE HER SECOND CABINET RESHUFFLE IN LESS THAN TWO WEEKS. EACH TIME, MRS. PERON'S FREEDOM TO CHOOSE HER OWN ADVISERS IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY MORE RESTRICTED. 4

LABOR LEADERS HAD DEMANDED THAT RODRIGO, A PROTEGE OF FORMER PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER LOPEZ REGA, BE REPLACED BECAUSE OF HIS ROLE IN LAST MONTH'S ATTEMPT TO ROLL BACK WAGE INCREASES. WITH RODRIGO GONE, PRESSURE FROM LABOR--AND MOST LIKELY FROM POLITICIANS AND THE MILITARY AS WELL--FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF OTHER CABINET MEMBERS LINKED

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TO LOPEZ REGA WILL ERON-V

THE DISCREDITED LOPEZ REGA REPORTEDLY LEFT ON JULY 20
FOR MADRID AFTER A STOPOVER IN RIO DE JANEIRO. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~
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EAST ASIA BRIEF 112-75-4

1. PYONGYANG HAS CONSENTED TO REOPEN TALKS WITH SEOUL AS PART OF A BROADER CAMPAIGN TO PROJECT AN IMAGE OF FLEXIBILITY AND REASON. EARLIER THIS WEEK, THE NORTH AGREED TO RESUME RED CROSS NEGOTIATIONS ON JULY 23. THE TALKS, UNTIL THEY WERE POSTPONED BY PYONGYANG A MONTH AGO, HAD BEEN ADDRESSING SUCH PROBLEMS AS THE REUNION OF SEPARATED FAMILIES.
NORTH KOREA IS ALSO SOUNDING A SOFTER NOTE ON ITS PRECONDITIONS FOR RESUMING THE NORTH-SOUTH COORDINATING COMMITTEE TALKS. THE COMMITTEE, ESTABLISHED IN JULY 1972 TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION, LAST MET IN MAY.
DURING HIS VISIT TO EAST EUROPE AND NORTH AFRICA IN MAY AND JUNE, PRESIDENT KIM IL-SONG BEGAN TO REEMPHASIZE THAT NORTH KOREA SEEKS REUNIFICATION OF THE PENINSULA BY PEACEFUL MEANS AND HAS CONTINUED THIS LINE WITH RECENT VISITORS TO PYONGYANG. THIS WEEK A DELEGATION OF JAPANESE SOCIALISTS RETURNED HOME WITH WORD THAT NORTH KOREA WILL PUT OUT A NEW PEACE PROPOSAL ON JULY 20. THE NORTH IS PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO ENHANCE ITS PROSPECTS FOR

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MEMBERSHIP IN THE CONFERENCE OF NONALIGNED NATIONS IN AUGUST AND FOR PASSAGE OF A RESOLUTION FAVORABLE TO ITS INTERESTS AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS FALL. [CONFIDENTIAL] 4

2. KOREA: THE FIRST EXCHANGE OF FIRE WITHIN THE KOREAN DMZ THIS YEAR OCCURRED FRIDAY WHEN A NORTH KOREAN GUARD POST FIRED ON A SOUTH KOREAN PATROL. A BRIEF EXCHANGE ENSUED, BUT NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED. THE LAST DMZ FIRING INCIDENT TOOK PLACE LAST NOVEMBER, WHEN A SOUTH KOREAN PATROL UNCOVERED THE FIRST NORTH KOREAN - BUILT DMZ TUNNEL. WHILE NO EXCAVATION HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF THE LATEST ENCOUNTER, SEOUL IS CONDUCTING ANTI-TUNNEL DRILLING OPERATIONS SOME FIVE ANUTICAL MILES TO THE EAST. [SECRET] E-2 IMPDET-H

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EUROPEAN BRIEF 112-75-4

1. PORTUGAL: PORTUGUESE SOCIALISTS PUT ON AN IMPRESSIVE SHOW OF PUBLIC SUPPORT OVER THE WEEKEND, PROVING TO THE RIVAL COMMUNISTS AS WELL AS TO THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT THAT THEY ARE A FORCE WHICH CANNOT BE IGNORED.⁴

THE SOCIALISTS BROUGHT OUT MORE THAN 70,000 SUPPORTERS FOR A RALLY IN OPORTO ON FRIDAY, FOLLOWED BY AN EVEN LARGER DEMONSTRATION IN LISBON THE NEXT DAY. THE COMMUNISTS UNSUCCESSFULLY TRIED TO BLOCK BOTH DEMONSTRATIONS, EXHORTING PARTY MILITANTS TO STOP THE SOCIALISTS "BY ANY POSSIBLE MEANS" AND WARNING THE PUBLIC OF A "MARCH ON LISBON BY REACTIONARY FORCES."⁴

BARRICADES WERE SET UP BY COMMUNIST MILITANTS ON THE MAIN ARTERIES INTO LISBON, BUT WERE LATER TAKEN OVER BY INTERNAL SECURITY TROOPS. COMMUNIST MILITANTS REMAINED NEAR MANY OF THE CHECKPOINTS, BUT THERE WERE ONLY ISOLATED INSTANCES OF CONFLICT BETWEEN COMMUNISTS AND SOCIALISTS.⁴

SOCIALIST LEADER SOARES TOOK A PARTICULARLY TOUGH STANCE

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AT THE LISBON RALLY, CALLING FOR THE RESIGNATION OF PRIME MINISTER GONCALVES. THE SOCIALISTS HAVE GROWN BOLDER IN THEIR CRITICISM SINCE WITHDRAWING FROM THE GOVERNMENT TEN DAYS AGO, MOVING FROM CRITICAL REMARKS OF COMMUNIST CONTROL OVER LABOR, THE PRESS, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT TO DIRECT ATTACKS ON THE PARTY ITSELF AND ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT OFFICERS ASSOCIATED WITH THE COMMUNISTS.⁴

SOARES PROBABLY IS HOPING TO ENCOURAGE MODERATES IN THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, WHO ARE REPORTEDLY PLOTTING TO OUST GONCALVES. THE MODERATES' PLAN HINGES ON FORCING GONCALVES TO OFFER HIS RESIGNATION BY FRUSTRATING HIS ATTEMPTS TO FORM A NEW CABINET, BUT THEY APPEAR TO BE TEMPORIZING AND GONCALVES MAY BE STALLING.⁴

THE MODERATES ARE UNCERTAIN THAT PRESIDENT COSTA GOMES WILL SUPPORT THEIR PLAN AND ACCEPT GONCALVES' RESIGNATION IF HE SHOULD SUBMIT IT. COSTA GOMES' COMMENTED ON SATURDAY ABOUT THE KIND OF NEW GOVERNMENT HE WANTS—A COALITION REPRESENTING ALL THE "SOCIALIST FORCES" BUT

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NOT ONE IN WHICH THE MINISTERS WOULD REPRESENT THEIR RESPECTIVE PARTIES. THIS STATEMENT PROVIDES LITTLE CLUE TO WHAT THE PRESIDENT REALLY WANTS. HIS EMPHASIS ON THE "RAPID ESTABLISHMENT" OF A NEW CABINET HAS PROMPTED PRESS SPECULATION THAT HE WILL REPLACE GONCALVES IF THE PRIME MINISTER CANNOT COME UP WITH A CABINET SOON.⁴

THE COMMUNIST-DOMINATED PROPAGANDA DIVISION OF THE ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF IS DEFENDING GONCALVES AGAINST SOARES, CLAIMING THAT GONCALVES IS ESSENTIAL TO THE UNITY OF THE ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT.⁴

THE COMMUNIST PARTY HAS USED ITS INFLUENCE OVER THE MEDIA FURTHER TO SUPPORT GONCALVES. THE SUCCESS OF THE SOCIALIST RALLIES WAS PLAYED DOWN IN THE MEDIA, WHILE MESSAGES OF SUPPORT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM "POPULAR ORGANIZATIONS." RECEIVED PROMINENT COVERAGE.⁴

THE COMMUNISTS ARE INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR WANING POPULARITY IN NORTHERN PORTUGAL. NEVER ACCEPTED BY THE GENERALLY CONSERVATIVE NORTH, THEY NOW FIND THEMSELVES

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THE VICTIM OF A GROWING NUMBER OF VIOLENT INCIDENTS. TROOPS HAVE BEEN CALLED IN ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS TO DISPERSE CROWDS BENT ON STORMING AND SACKING COMMUNIST PARTY OFFICES. IN ONE SUCH INSTANCE, A SOLDIER WAS KILLED BY A STRAY BULLET WHEN THE TROOPS FIRED INTO THE AIR. {SECRET}4

2. USSR-PORTUGAL: MOSCOW HAS PLACED ITSELF MORE FULLY AND OPENLY ON THE SIDE OF THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNISTS AND ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT IN THE CURRENT POLITICAL CRISIS.4

OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS SIGNED COMMENTARIES HAVE APPEARED IN IZVESTIYA AND PRAVDA PILLORYING THE PORTUGUESE SOCIALISTS AND EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR THE ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT. THE IZVESTIYA COMMENTARY, GOING FARTHER THAN MOSCOW HAS HERETOFORE, ASSERTS THAT THE "NEW PORTUGAL" CAN COUNT ON ACTIVE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FROM THE "SOCIALIST" COUNTRIES. THE PORTUGUESE SOCIALISTS ARE, IN ESSENCE, CHARGED WITH BEING CLASS ENEMIES.4

MOSCOW'S MORE FORTHRIGHT BACKING OF THE ARMED

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FORCES MOVEMENT AND THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNISTS SUGGESTS THE SOVIETS EXPECT THE RAPIDLY DEVELOPING CRISIS WILL SOON COME TO A HEAD. THE SOVIETS CLEARLY WANT TO BE PUBLICLY ALIGNED WITH THE "PROGRESSIVE" FORCES, BUT THEY ALSO MAY HAVE BEEN UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNISTS TO TAKE A STRONGER STAND. {CONFIDENTIAL}

IF, AS MOSCOW APPARENTLY BELIEVES, THE ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT COMES OUT ON TOP, THE SOVIETS WILL BE IN A BETTER POSITION IN LISBON. EVEN IF THINGS GO BADLY FOR THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNISTS, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIET GESTURE OF SUPPORT AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE COULD HELP PROTECT MOSCOW FROM CRITICISM WITHIN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. {CONFIDENTIAL}

3. ROMANIA: CEAUSESCU MAY ATTEMPT TO DEFLECT CRITICISM FROM HIMSELF AT A CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM ON MONDAY BY SEEKING SCAPEGOATS FOR DEFICIENCIES

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IN THE COUNTRY'S FLOOD CONTROL MEASURES.⁴

THE ROMANIAN LEADER IS ON THE SPOT BECAUSE HIS OBSESSION WITH RAPID INDUSTRIALIZATION HAS PREVENTED THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FLOOD CONTROL PROGRAM THAT THE REGIME ADOPTED IN 1970. POSSIBLE SCAPEGOATS INCLUDE VIRGIL TROFIN, A KNOWN CEAUSESCU CRITIC WHO HAS BEEN EXILED AS FIRST SECRETARY TO BRASOV, AND ANGELO MICULESCU, THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE, FOOD, AND WATERS. SOME LOCAL PARTY OFFICIALS IN THOSE AREAS HARDEST HIT BY THE FLOODS MAY ALSO BE OUSTED.⁴

CEAUSESCU'S LONG-HELD DETERMINATION TO FULFILL THE COUNTRY'S CURRENT FIVE-YEAR PLAN IS UNDIMINISHED. THE POPULATION HAS BEEN MOBILIZED TO SALVAGE THE HARVEST, AND INCREASED PRESSURE IS BEING PUT ON MANY ALREADY HARD-PRESSED WORKERS TO MAKE UP FOR FLOOD-RELATED PRODUCTION LOSSES BY THE END OF THE YEAR.⁴

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PUBLIC MORALE, ALREADY LOW BECAUSE OF THE REGIME'S INSENSITIVITY TO CONSUMER INTERESTS, HAS UNDOUBTEDLY DETERIORATED SINCE BUCHAREST ANNOUNCED PRICE INCREASES LAST WEEKEND. ROMANIANS MUST NOW PAY 203 PERCENT MORE FOR HEATING OIL AND 25 PERCENT MORE FOR NATURAL GAS. THE REGIME, HOWEVER, ATTEMPTED TO OFFSET SOME OF THE BURDEN BY ANNOUNCING TOKEN ACROSS-THE-BOARD WAGE INCREASES.⁴

SOME FORM OF POPULAR DISCONTENT, SUCH AS WORK SLOW-DOWNS AND STOPPAGES, IS LIKELY. ALTHOUGH CEAUSESCU'S POSITION DOES NOT APPEAR THREATENED, HE IS NONETHELESS INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE TO POPULAR CRITICISM. HE IS QUITE CAPABLE OF MEETING ANY CHALLENGE, HOWEVER, BY CAREFULLY MEASURED CONCESSIONS AND BY INCREASING HIS EFFORTS TO SEEK FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. {CONFIDENTIAL}H

4. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: POLITICAL MODERATES FAVORING CHANGES IN THE
ECONOMIC SYSTEM MAY HAVE TEMPORARILY GAINED THE

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UPPER HAND OVER ULTRACONSERVATIVES IN THE CZECHOSLOVAK REGIME AT LEAST ON THIS ISSUE.⁴

RUDE PRAVO, THE PARTY DAILY, LAST WEEK QUIETLY REVEALED A POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT POLICY SHIFT IN AN ARTICLE ENTITLED, "CHANGES IN THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM." THE ARTICLE--WRITTEN BY JAROSLAV KRATOCHVIL, A MEMBER OF THE PARTY'S NATIONAL ECONOMY COMMISSION--CAREFULLY AVOIDS SPECIFIC CHANGES, BUT IT DOES CITE THE NEED FOR A "MAJOR CHANGE IN THE CURRENT SYSTEM AND GREATER PROGRESSIVENESS IN THE PREPARED MODIFICATIONS."⁴

PUBLIC ADMISSION OF FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC SHORTCOMINGS IS HIGHLY UNUSUAL FOR THE HUSAK REGIME. PUBLICATION OF THE ARTICLE FOLLOWS NUMEROUS DEBATES IN CLOSED COUNCILS SINCE LAST NOVEMBER'S PLENUM OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE DELVED INTO KEY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.⁴

THE CHANGES ARE DESCRIBED AS "DRAFT MODIFICA-

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TIONS" DESIGNED BY "LARGE COLLECTIVES OF REPRESENTATIVES OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND PRACTICES," WHICH SUGGESTS THAT DISCUSSIONS MAY BE FAR FROM OVER. THE CONFLICTING GOALS OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES--STRENGTHENING CENTRAL CONTROL AND PLANNING, ON THE ONE HAND, AND ENCOURAGING INITIATIVE AT LOWER LEVELS OF MANAGEMENT, ON THE OTHER--ALSO SUGGEST PLENTY OF ROOM FOR DEBATE. SHOULD THE DISCUSSIONS SHOW SIGNS OF SHARPENING DIVISIONS IN THE LEADERSHIP, PARTY BOSS HUSAK MAY REJECT SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES AND MERELY TINKER WITH THE EXISTING MECHANISM.²⁴

A TRIAL BALLOON FOR THE PROPOSALS MAY HAVE BEEN LAUNCHED LAST DECEMBER, WHEN HERBERT DURKOVIC, A SLOVAK DEPUTY PREMIER AND A MEMBER OF THE SLOVAK PARTY PRESIDIUM, PUBLISHED TWO ARTICLES STRESSING THE NEED FOR MORE FLEXIBILITY IN THE ECONOMY--IN PARTICULAR MORE INITIATIVE AT THE ENTERPRISE LEVEL.

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DURKOVIC, HOWEVER, APPARENTLY WENT TOO FAR BY FLATLY ASSERTING THAT NOT EVERY IDEA FROM THE DUBCEK REFORM PERIOD SHOULD BE DISMISSED OUT OF HAND AS REACTIONARY AND UNACCEPTABLE. THERE WAS NO ENSUING PUBLIC DEBATE OVER THE MERITS OF IMPLEMENTING CHANGES IN THE SYSTEM, BUT LAST WEEK'S ARTICLE SUGGESTS THAT THE SUBJECT HAS BEEN UNDER CONSIDERATION WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP. {CONFIDENTIAL}4

5. BULGARIA: THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY LAST WEEK HELD ITS FIFTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE IN 60 YEARS TO DISCUSS ORGANIZATIONAL AND DISCIPLINARY PROBLEMS. PARTY CHIEF TODOR ZHIVKOV SHOWED CONCERN OVER THE PARTY'S LAGGING IDEOLOGICAL AWARENESS BY CALLING ON PARTY ORGANIZATIONS AND MEMBERS "FROM TOP TO BOTTOM" TO PERFORM THEIR DUTIES WITH INCREASED DILIGENCE.4

ZHIVKOV REMINDED PARTY LEADERS OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE AS ACTIVE "POLITICAL MANAGERS"

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IN WORK COLLECTIVES. HE TOOK A SPECIAL DIG AT CADRE WHO KNUCKLE UNDER TO THE ECONOMIC TECHNOCRATS, THUS IMPLYING THAT THESE CADRE HAD PERMITTED "MONETARY INCENTIVES" TO BE STRESSED AT THE EXPENSE OF "MORAL INCENTIVES" IN EFFORTS TO INCREASE PRODUCTION.

ZHIVKOV ALSO CITED SHORTCOMINGS IN THE PERSONAL AND MORAL QUALITIES OF THE MEMBERSHIP. HE REVEALED THAT IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY TO PUNISH A "SIGNIFICANT NUMBER" OF PARTY MEMBERS FOR UNBECOMING AND ILLEGAL CONDUCT, THEREBY "PROVING" THAT TOO MANY HAD LOST SIGHT OF THE PARTY'S ORIGINAL SPIRIT. ZHIVKOV TOOK A SWIPE AT OPPORTUNISM AND YOUTH BY REMARKING THAT YOUNG BULGARIANS ALL TOO OFTEN JOIN THE PARTY AND ITS YOUTH ORGANIZATION FOR "THEIR OWN SELFISH REASONS," SUCH AS PERSONAL ADVANCEMENT.⁴

ZHIVKOV, WHO HAS LONG BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT MAINTAINING TIGHT PARTY DISCIPLINE, MAY HAVE BEEN

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PROMPTED TO MAKE THESE LATEST REMARKS BY THE PROSPECT OF INCREASED EAST-WEST CONTACTS. A TIGHTENING OF PARTY DISCIPLINE THROUGHOUT EASTERN EUROPE HAS BEEN IN EVIDENCE SINCE DECEMBER 1973, WHEN PARTY SECRETARIES RESPONSIBLE FOR ORGANIZATIONAL AND CADRE AFFAIRS FIRST MET IN MOSCOW TO PREPARE RULING PARTIES FOR THE CHALLENGE POSED BY DETENTE.⁴

IT IS LIKELY THAT THE BULGARIAN LEADERSHIP WILL INCREASE ITS EFFORTS TO TIGHTEN DISCIPLINE AS IT PREPARES FOR A PARTY CONGRESS, NOW SLATED TO BE HELD IN MARCH 1976. ZHIVKOV'S CRITICISM OF THE PARTY'S PERFORMANCE ALSO SUGGESTS THAT FURTHER PERSONNEL CHANGES ARE LIKELY BEFORE THE CONGRESS MEETS. [CONFIDENTIAL]⁴

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6. USSR: [REDACTED] AND THE RESULTS

OF THE RSFSR SUPREME SOVIET ELECTIONS INDICATE THAT THE SENIOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE MAIN POLITICAL DIRECTORATE OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, COLONEL GEN-

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ERAL N. A. NACHINKIN {68}, HAS RETIRED. NACHINKIN WAS REPLACED BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL M. G. SOBOLEV, CHIEF OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL PARTY WORK DIRECTORATE OF THE MAIN POLITICAL DIRECTORATE.4

THIS IS THE SECOND MAJOR RETIREMENT IN THE POLITICAL DIRECTORATE WITHIN THE PAST YEAR. IN THE FALL OF 1974, THE FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE DIRECTORATE RETIRED AND WAS REPLACED BY COLONEL GENERAL G. V. SREDIN {58}. THE THIRD RANKING DEPUTY IN THE POLITICAL DIRECTORATE IS LIEUTENANT GENERAL S. A. BOBYLEV {53}. FORMERLY CHIEF OF THE LENINGRAD MILITARY DISTRICT'S POLITICAL DIRECTORATE, BOBYLEV WAS BROUGHT TO MOSCOW FOLLOWING THE RETIREMENT OF THE FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF IN 1974.4

THIS REJUVENATION OF THE UPPER ECHELONS OF THE MAIN POLITICAL DIRECTORATE MAY PORTEND A CHANGE IN THE LEADERSHIP OF THE DIRECTORATE. ARMY GENERAL YEPISHEV, THE CHIEF, IS 57 YEARS OLD AND MAY

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